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I
INTRODUCTION
T HE OBJECTIVE of this paper is to set forth in as compre-
hensive a manner as possible the present status' of the law with
respect to the taxability of scholarship and fellowship grants. It
should be recognized at the outset that the issue is not one of in-
frequent occurrence. In fact, in spite of the avowed purpose of
Congress -in enacting section 117 ,of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, -which provides "rules for determining the extent to which
amounts received as scholarships and as fellowship grants are to be
included in gross income," 2 it has been stated that its enactment,
rather than stabilizing the law and reducing controversies, has in
fact resulted in an increase in disputes between the Commissioner
and recipients of such awards. Professor Donald H. Gordon has
stated that
[I]f one compares the cases and rulings under the 1954 Code with those
under pre-1954 law, one sees that there has been little change of focus....
The value of section 117 lies not in providing a solution to the problem
but rather in its recognition that scholarships and fellowships are
sufficiently unique in terms of their social function ... to merit treat-
ment separate from that accorded gifts and compensation. 3
One writer charges that the present application of section 117 is
* The views expressed are the author's and should not be considered as being the
opinion of the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, or the Chief
Counsel's Office.
tA.X. 1944, University of Florida; LL.B. 1950, University of Michigan; Assistant
Regional Counsel, Atlanta Region, Internal Revenue Service.
I The underlined words were chosen in lieu of the words "a clarification or simpli.
fication" as the latter is well nigh impossible. The reader will no doubt so conclude
after reading this paper.
2S. REP. No. 1622. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954) [hereinafter cited as S. RP.P. No.
1622].
3Gordon, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants as Incone: A Search for Treasury
Policy, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 144, 151. See also 13 J. TAxATION 272 (1960).
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creating "new dissatisfaction" with taxation in this area.4 Professor
Gordon is of the view that while the enactment of section 117
was designed to relieve prior uncertainties, such grants have been
"more severely" treated than they were prior to the enactment of
the section."
II
STATUS OF THE LAW UNDER THE 1939 CODE
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained no provision
comparable to section 117. Under the 1939 Code the test for de-
termining whether scholarships and fellowship grants were ex-
cludable from gross income was based upon the so-called "gift v.
compensation" theory, i.e., if it could be shown that the amounts
received were, in fact, gifts under section 22 (b) (3) of the 1939 Code,
the recipient did not have to include them in his gross income; if
such grants were determined to be in the nature of compensation,
then the result was to the contrary.6 The test apparently was
similar to that used in determining the taxability of prizes and
awards.
A. The Commissioner's Apparent Effort to Clarify the Law
In 1951 an effort was made by the Internal Revenue Service to
clarify the Commissioner's position with regard to scholarships and
fellowship grants through promulgation of Income Tax Ruling
4056.7 In essence, this ruling provided:
The amount of a grant or fellowship award is includible in gross
income unless it can be established that such amount is a gift. If a grant
or fellowship award is made for the training and education of an indi-
vidual, either as a part of his program in acquiring a degree or in other-
wise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered
as consideration therefor, the amount of the grant or award is a gift
which is excludable from gross income. However, when the recipient
of a grant or fellowship applies his skill and training to advance research,
creative work, or some other project or activity, the essential elements
of a gift as contemplated by section 22 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code are not present, and the amount of the grant or fellowship is
includible in the recipient's gross income. (Emphasis added.)
' Mansfield, Income from Prizes and Awards and from Scholarships and Fellowship
Grants, N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FED. TAx 146 (1961).
5 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 151.
6 See I MERTENs, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.42 (1962 rev.).
I.T. Rul. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 8, 10 [hereinafter cited as I.T. 4056].
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I.T. 4056 sets forth four examples involving recipients of fellow-
ship grants. In three of the cases the fellowships were granted in
order that each recipient could conduct independent research in his
chosen field. In the fourth case the fellowship was granted in order
to provide the recipient with a source of funds upon which to exist
while he was in the process of writing a novel. Although the facts of
each case as set forth in I.T. 4056 were somewhat sketchy, the Com-
missioner took the position that in no case were the grants for the
training or education of the recipients, but rather each recipient was
required by the grantor, in exchange for the grant, to apply his
respective skill and training to .advance research or creative work,
Accordingly, on the authority of United States v. Robertson," which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court9 after publication of I.T. 4056,
the Commissioner held that the grants were not excludable from
gross income as gifts under 1939 Code section 22 (b) (3), but were
includable in gross income as compensation for personal services
under section 22 (a). The Robertson case involved an award to
Robertson for having composed the most outstanding symphony of
those submitting entries. Thus, in promulgating its ruling with
respect to the recipients of fellowships, the Commissioner relied prin-
cipally upon a case involving an award for outstanding creative work,
a case clearly falling in the "prizes and awards" category.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that in Robertson the
Supreme Court adhered to the rigid position that all services which
are performed in exchange for compensation are employment
services. The Court stated it thus:
The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services rendered
or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift....
Where the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant
that the donor derives no economic benefit from it. (Emphasis added.)
In the case of the four fellowships involved in I.T. 4056 the Com-
missioner reasoned:
It seems apparent that the awards herein considered were granted
on the basis of the qualifications of the recipients to do the work required
by their projects, which projects were approved by. the M Foundation with
the expectation of results consistent with the recipients' qualifications. To
the extent that there is any donative intent present in the making of an
190 F.2d 680 (loth Cir. 1951).
Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
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award, it appears that the beneficiary is society at large and not the
recipient of the award whose services are expected in return for the
grant. (Emphasis added.)
A careful reading of I.T. 4056 discloses that the Commissioner
Was simply taking the position that the activities of the four recipients
involved were more in the nature of compensation than they were in
the nature of gifts. Thus, it has been argued that the Commissioner's
apparent effort to clarify the law through I.T. 4056 was really no
clarification at all but simply an application of the timeworn "gift v.
compensation" test to the specific cases involved.
B. The Celebrated Stone Case
Three years later a recipient of a Guggenheim grant, George W.
Stone,10 who was dissatisfied with the state of the law as above ex-
pressed, litigated the issue and won a decision from a divided Tax
Court. Stone had been awarded a fellowship grant of $3,000 for
the period from September 1950 to August 1951 for the purpose of
allowing him to devote his full time and energies to research for and
the preparation of an eight-volume work on the history of London
dramatic performances from 1660 to 1800. Stone's research was in
a field of his own selection. The arrangement between the founda-
tion and Stone was not an employment contract in the sense that the
foundation did not (1) retain the authority to direct and control
Stone as to the details and means by which the project was carried
out; (2) require conformity with a schedule of working hours; (3)
supervise the work to see that it was carried out in a satisfactory
manner; or (4) require reports on Stone's progress or even his
completion of the task. In one sense, he was under no obligation
to perform services for the foundation or for any other person. He
nonetheless represented to the grantor that he would undertake the
project outlined and it was upon the basis of this representation that
the grantor agreed to award him the grant. The majority of the
court concluded that the grant was to facilitate the further education
or training of the recipient and thus was excludable from his gross
income.
1023 T.C. 254 (1954).
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C. Stone Pinpoints the Difficulty in Applying the
Commissioner's Test
It will be noted that the test applied by the majority in Stone-
that the grant was to facilitate the further education or training
of the recipient-accords with the first half of the pronouncement
by the Commissioner in I.T. 4056: "If a grant or fellowship award
is made for the training and education of an individual, either as
a part of his program in acquiring a degree or in otherwise further-
ing his educational development," the same is excludable from gross
income. When the minority opinion of Judge Turner is studied,
it is apparent that the minority would disallow the exclusion for the
reason that Stone was in effect "applying his skill and training to
advance research, creative work or some other project or activity""
in exchang&,or the grantor's promise to pay the award. This reason-
ing follows the concept espoused in the latter portion of I.T. 4056.
Recipients of such awards have argued that the case points up
the dilemma confronting them in that as a practical matter the re-
cipient's activity in most cases can be said to fit nicely into either
slot, i.e., the recipient can be furthering his education and training
and at the same time be applying his skill or training to advance
research, creative work, or some other project or activity in exchange
for the grant. The concepts are not mutually exclusive.
Congress was cognizant of this unsatisfactory state of things when
it was in the process of promulgating section 117 of the 1954 Code.
Congress recognized that the Internal Revenue Service had "not pro.
vided a clear-cut method"121 of determining taxability, and it sought
to provide rules' s in enacting section 117 to stabilize the law in this
area.
III
STATUS OF THE LAW UNDER THE 1994 CODE
An examination of section 117 and the Treasury Regulations 4
relating thereto reveal that neither is voluminous, the former con-
sisting of one page and the latter of five.
The statute first provides that in the case of an individual, gross
2" I.T. 4056.
22 S. REP. No. 1622.
23 Ibid.
14 Hereinafter cited as Regulations or Regs.
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income does not include any amount received as a scholarship at an
educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4) of the 1954
Code) or any amount received as a fellowship grant, including the
value of contributed services and accommodations. It is then pro-
vided that any amounts received to cover expenses for travel, 5
research, clerical help or equipment,' which are incident to the
scholarship or fellowship grant (to the extent so expended by the
recipient for such purpose) are likewise excludable.
A. Definition of Scholarships
At this point it is noteworthy to examine the definition of scholar-
ships and fellowship grants as set forth in regulations. A scholarship
is said to mean an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of,
a student, whether an undergraduate or a gradaute, to aid such
individual in pursuing his studies. The term includes the value of
contributed services and accommodations as well as any fees or
charges for matriculation, tuition, or the like. In addition, an amount
received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of the scholar-
ship is said to be includable. However, it "does not include any
amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other
individual . . .where the grantor is motivated by family or philan-
thropic considerations."' 7
B. Definition of Fellowship Grants
The definition of fellowship grants contained in regulations
section 1.117-3 (c) is substantially the same as the foregoing. As
a practical matter, it can properly be said that "fellowship grants"
generally apply to graduate students. "Scholarships" as a matter
of word usage is the all-inclusive generic term applicable to financial
aid to all students. 8
Under both definitions, however, the regulations 9 state that
among the items not considered as scholarships and fellowship grants
are amounts which represent compensation for past, present or future
" Including meals and lodging while traveling and an allowance for travel of the
recipient's family. Regs. § 1.117-1 (b) (1).
10 In the case of a grant awarded after July 28, 1956, the exclusion for travel,
research, clerical help or equipment is inapplicable unless the amount received is
specifically designated to cover such expenses. Regs. § 1.117-1 (b) (2) (i).
7 egs. § 1.117-3 (a).
18 P-H TAx IDEAS 5017.2 (1959).
R egs. § 1.117-4(c).
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employment service, or amounts which represent payment for serv-
ices which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor,.
or which enable the recipient to pursue studies or research primarily
for the benefit of the grantor. This rather broad rule is said not
to apply, however, if the primary purpose of the studies or research
is to further the education and training of the recipient in his indi-
vidual capacity and the amount provided by the grantor for such.
purpose does not represent compensation for past, present or future
employment services or services which are subject to the direction
or supervision of the grantor.
Moreover, neither the fact that the recipient is required to
furnish reports of his progress to the grantor nor the fact that the
results of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit
to the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential
character of such amount as a scholarslhip or fellowship grant.
C. Limitations On Exclusion-Degree Candidates
Having become familiar with the broad general exclusionary rule
and having examined the more precise regulatory definitions of
scholarships and fellowship grants, consideration should be given to
the statutory limitation imposed in determining whether the award
qualifies for income exclusion.
At the outset it must be emphasized that in the case of a scholar-
ship the award must be for the purpose of enabling the recipient
to pursue studies at an "educational institution." The Code pro-
vision refers to section 151 (e) (4) where such an institution is defined
as a school having a regular faculty and curriculum and an organized
student body in attendance.20 Apparently the recipient need not
attend the same institution which is the grantor of the award, i.e.,
the award could be made under a corporation's scholarship program
for study at any qualified educational institution.
In the case of recipients who are candidates for degrees the Code
and regulations provide only one limitation. Generally, amounts
received as payment for teaching, research or other services in the
nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving
the award are included in the recipient's gross income. Even in this
case said amounts will be fully excludable if such services are uni-
formly required of all such degree candidates. An example of this
20See also Regs. § 1.117-3 (b).
[V7ol. 1963: 488
SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP
limitation is the case where an individual receiving an award is
required to teach part-time and this requirement is a condition
precedent to receiving the award. The criterion for determining
how much to include in gross income is what is usually paid for
similar services to an individual who is not an award recipient.
If the recipient of the grant is required to furnish periodic reports
to the grantor regarding his progress this alone would not constitute
part-time employment. Thus, it would not disqualify any portion of
the award and the excludable feature would prevail.2'
D. Limitations On Exclusion-Non-degree Candidates
The limitations upon those recipients who are not candidates for
a degree are very precisely defined. First, there is a basic require-*
ment that the grantor be a tax exempt organization described in
section 501 (c) (3) or it must be the United States or an instru-
mentality or agency thereof, or a state, a territory, or a possession
of the United States or any political subdivision thereof, or the
District of Columbia. For years beginning after December 31, 1961,
grants from foreign governments, international organizations, or
foundations or commissions created or continued under the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 are likewise ex-
cludable.22
To qualify as a tax exempt organization under section 501 (c) (3)
the grantor must meet four tests:
1. It must be organized and operated exclusively for one or more
specific purposes, e.g., religious, charitable, scientific, educational,
etc.
2. It must not have any part of its net earnings inure to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
3. It must not devote a substantial part of its activities attempting
to influence legislation.
4. It may not participate or intervene in any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Thus, awards or grants to non-degree candidates made by a busi-
ness corporation or by an individual would be wholly taxable.
This, of course, necessitates a determination as to whether the actual
21 Regs. § 1.117-2 (a) (1).
22 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 117 (2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-256, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. §§ 110(a), 110(h)(1) (Sept. 21, 1961).
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payor is the grantor or is possibly merely the paying agent for a
grantor.
In this connection it should not be overlooked that in many cases
an award though it may not qualify as an exclusion under section 117
nevertheless may be deductible by the recipient as an educational
expense,23 a subject beyond the scope of this paper.
After it has been established that the grantor qualifies there is a
limitation as to the amount that can be excluded by a non-degree
recipient. Under section 117 (b) (2) (B), the amount is limited to
$300 a month for a maximum period of 36 months.
It is first necessary to determine the period of the grant. The
number of months is computed on the basis of whole calendar
months. A whole calendar month is defined as "a period of time
terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically cor-
responding to the day of the month of its beginning, less one, except
that if there be no corresponding day of the succeeding month the
period terminates with the last day of the succeeding mouth."2' A
fractional part of a calendar month consisting of at least 15 days is
treated as a-whole calendar month. A period of less than 15 days is
disregarded.
Example 1. A recipient receives a grant which is to run from
September 11 to May 10 of the following year. The length of the
grant is 8 months. If, however, the grant ran from September 11 to
May 25 its length would be 9 months.
The $300, 36-month limitation applies if the individual has re-
ceived any amount (either excluded or excludable) for any previous
36 months, whether or not consecutive. Once used up the grantee is
not entitled to any further exclusions as a non-degree recipient. It
would seem, however, that he would be eligible for exclusions for
awards granted him as a candidate for a degree.
Example 2. A recipient receives a three-year grant of $9,000
which was paid in 36 monthly installments of $250 each. He has
used up his allowable exclusions even though he received $50 a
month less than the maximum.
Where an individual receives more than one grant during the
taxable year the amount excludable from gross income is based on the
aggregate amount received. If the period 'of time of the grants
"Regs. § 1.162-5.
Regs. § 1.117-2 (b) (2) (i).
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overlaps, the months are counted only once; they are not com-
pounded.
Example 3. A recipient receives a grant from A of $350 per
month to run from February 1 to June 30 of one taxable year.
He also receives from B a grant of $200 per month to run from
March 1 to December 31 of the same taxable year. In this instance
he is treated as having received amounts for 11 months of the taxable
year. His maximum exclusion would thus be $3,300 ($300 x 11).
Since, however, he has received $3,750 from both grants he must
include $450 in gross income. His future excludable balance would
be $300 a month for 25 months.
Suppose a recipient received a grant for a period covering two
taxable years. What is the tax treatment?
Example 4. X receives a grant of $5,600 to run from October 5
to May 23 of the following year. He receives $700 per month from
October through May. In this instance he may exclude $900 in the
former taxable year and $1,500 in the latter. He must include
in his gross income $1,200 in the former taxable year and $2,000
in the latter.
Suppose, however, that an individual receives a grant for a period
covering two taxable years, but the entire amount is paid in one year.
Example 5. X received his grant of $5,600 to run from October-
5 to May 23 of the following year as in the last example above.
But in this instance he receives the entire $5,600 on October
5. Since the $5,600 received in the one taxable year is for the full
8-month term of the grant, X may exclude $2,400 ($300 x 8) from
his gross income in the taxable year in which he received the funds.
The balance of $3,200 ($5,600-$2,400) is includable in his gross
income in that same taxable year of receipt.25
E. The Exclusive Nature of Section 117
It is most important to understand that the exclusion from gross
income of an amount which is a scholarship or fellowship grant is
controlled solely by section 117. Accordingly, to the extent that
such an award exceeds the limitations spelled out hereinabove it is
includable in the gross income of the recipient, notwithstanding the
provisions of section 102 relating to the exclusion from gross income
25 All of the foregoing examples were derived from P-H TAX IDEAS 5017.2 (a
discussion of the corresponding examples in the regulations).
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of gifts or section 74 (b) relating to the exclusion from gross income
of certain prizes and awards.28
F. Regulations Section 1.117-4 (c)
An analysis of the court decisions and Internal Revenue Service
rulings subsequent to the enactment of section 117 will disclose that
a substantial percentage of the disputes have centered around regu-
lations section 1.117-4 (c). This section provides as follows:
1.117-4 Items not considered as scholarships or fellowship grants.
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of
section 117:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the
benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount
paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to
pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compen-
sation for past, present, or future employment services or represents
payment for services which are subject to the direction or supervision
of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
grantor.
However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual
to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section
117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the
education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and
the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is required to
furnish reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the fact that the results
of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit to the grantor
shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character of such
amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
In Frank Thomas Bachmura 2 7 an argument was unsuccessfully
made to the effect that the regulations erroneously interpret the in-
tent of Congress as expressed in the statute and committee reports.
Bachmura, the recipient of a Rockefeller Foundation grant, was
a non-degree candidate who devoted three-fourths of his time
to research and one-fourth to teaching. Bachmura argued that it
1 Regs. § 1.117-1 (a).
2732 T.C. 111-7 (1959).
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was not intended that in the case of non-degree recipients the fact
that a grant is in the nature of compensation for employment services
would entirely preclude its exclusion from income. The argument
proceeded thus.
The House Report2 s stated:
In the case of individuals who are not candidates for degrees, the
bill provides a specific standard to be used in determining whether the
grant is in effect a salary payment. In the case of such individuals, the
grant is excluded only. if the annual amount.., plus any compensation
received from the recipient's previous employer is less than 75 percent
of the recipient's salary in the year preceding the grant.
This will tax those grants which are in effect merely payments of a
salary during a period while the recipient is on leave from his regular
job. Hence, in the case of persons who have completed their formal
education and are continuing to teach or carry on research as part of
their life work, the grant will be excluded only if it is merely a supple-
paent to the individual's own funds which make it possible for him
to carry on research or further his educational development. (Emphasis
added.)
The Senate, in considering the proposed 75 per cent test of the
House, indicated that it was of the view that said test could result
in inequity, particularly where a recipient might have received an
inconsequential salary in a previous year. Accordingly, the 75
per cent test was eliminated and the $300 per month, 36 months limi-
tation was substituted therefor. The Senate Report29 stated:
The House bill provided a specific standard for determining the
taxability of grants received by individuals who are not candidates for
a degree, typically the recipients of post-doctoral fellowships. Such
grants may. be in effect a continuing salary payment while the recipient
is on leave from his regular job. The House bill specified that such
grants are excludible only if the annual amount of the grant plus any
compensation received from the recipient's previous employer is less
than 75 per cent of the recipient's salary in the year preceding the grant.
Cases were brought to your committee's attention in which the formula
of the House bill would tax grants which were clearly not a continuing
salary payment. In many of these cases taxability would result from the
absence of a substantial earned income in the previous year. Your
committee therefore has substituted for the 75 per cent rule an exclusion
of $300 per month of grants paid to individuals who are not candidates
for degrees. The exclusion will not be allowed beyond a total of 36
ionths. (Emphasis added.)
-1 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954).
10 S. REP. No. 1622. at 18.
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Manifestly, the Senate was cognizant of the fact that some of the
post-doctoral fellowship grants were, in effect, continuing salary
payments. Nonetheless, the Senate chose to include such grants
under section 117 in spite of the compensating nature of the grant
and simply limit their excludability by the $300, 36-month test.
It was further argued that the House was well aware of the
fact that certain grants, particularly those for the performance of
teaching and research services, might well be compensatory in nature.
In discussing its proposed section 117 (b), the House suggested an
allocation of awards in such circumstances as follows:
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the
performance of teaching or research services, the exclusion is not to apply
to that portion which represents payments which are in effect a wage or
salary. The amount included will be determined by reference to the
going rates of pay for similar services. This allocation of the amount
of the grant between taxable and nontaxable portions represents more
liberal treatment than is allowed under present practice. Present law
taxes the grant in its entirety. unless services required of the recipient are
nominal. (Emphasis added.)
The Senate, in considering the position of the House, chose to
be even more liberal with regard to teaching and research services
by non-degree candidates. The House had taken the position that
it recognized that payments for teaching and research services con-
stituted compensation and should be taxed at the prevailing rate of
compensation for such services. The Senate, however, decided that
only degree candidates should be taxed upon payments made for
these services. The effect of the Senate Committee amendment,
Bachmura argued, was to indicate an intent, by implication if not
expressed, that non-degree candidates might receive awards which
were continuing salary payments and yet still be held to be covered
by section 117, subject to the $300, 36-month limitation. The Senate
Report stated:30
Subsection (b) [of section 117] prescribes rules limiting the amount
which may be excluded under subsection (a). Paragraph (1) of this sub-
section as passed by the House provided that the exclusion does not apply
to any amount which represents payment for teaching or research services
in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to
receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant. This paragraph has been
1"Id. at 188-89.
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amended by your committee so as to be applicable only to individuals
who are candidates for degrees at an educational institution .... " (Em-
phasis added.)
Bachmura thus argued that insofar as regulations section 1.117-
4 (c) attempts to preclude the exclusion entirely (and not simply
limit it to the $300, 36-month test) in the case of non-degree candi-
dates, where the services to be performed by the recipient are in
the nature of employment services, said regulations may have mis-
interpreted congressional intent.
G. The Position .of the Tax Court
The position taken by the Tax Court when it was confronted
with the foregoing is of interest. The Court summarily disposed
of petitioner's argument as follows:
31
We agree that amounts received as a fellowship grant may be com-
pensatory in character, and that with the enactment of section 117 of the
1954 Code it no longer follows that such amounts are to be included in
gross income merely because they were in the nature of compensation for
services rendered. But further, we are of the view that respondent's
regulation, section 1.117-4 (c), is not to the contrary, as petitioner con-
tends.
It is patent, we think, that Congress never intended that the exclusion
provided in section 117 (a) should apply to payments received by an
individual not a candidate for a degree merely because they were received
from an educational or charitable institution or foundation meeting the
requirements as set forth in section 117 (b) (2) (A).
According to section 1.117-4 (c), payments received, even though to
enable the recipient to pursue studies or research, are not to be regarded
as amounts received as fellowship grants within the meaning of section
117 and as such excluded from gross income, if the payments represent
compensation for what in the regulation has been termed "employment
services." On the other hand, the regulation recognizes as excludable
under section 117 (a) payments even though compensatory in character,
provided they are amounts paid to the individual to enable him to pursue
studies or research, if the primary purpose of such studies or research
is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual
capacity, and provided they do not represent compensation for "employ-
ment services," as previously indicated. It would thus appear that the
respondent in his interpretation and application of section 117 has con-
cluded that where in the case of an individual who is not a candidate
8l1 Frank Thomas Bachmura, 82 T.C. 1117, 1125-26 (1959).
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for a degree the arrangement between the parties is primarily one of
employment and the payments, even though for research, are primarily
payments of compensation as such and their primary purpose is not that
of enabling the recipient to carry on the studies or research in furtherance
of his own education and training, such payments are not to be regarded
as amounts received as a fellowship grant within the meaning of section
117. (Emphasis added.)
IV
CONCLUSION
Obviously, the foregoing points up the rather confused state of
things and probably justifies the position of Professor Gordon that
"the value of section 117 lies not in providing a solution to the
problem but rather in its recognition that scholarships and fellow-
ships are sufficiently unique . .. to merit treatment separate from
that accorded gifts and compensation." 32
That the law in this area is still not free from doubt is quite
clear, as witness the numerous rulings and cases pending. Perhaps
the best guide line that can be used in attempting to evaluate the
merits of any given issue, irrespective of whether a degree or non-
degree candidate is involved, is contained in the Government's brief
in the case of Chander P. Bhalla3 and quoted with approval by the
court as follows:
It is apparent from the above cited regulations and rulings that
whether a payment qualifies as a scholarship or fellowship grant ex-
cludable from gross income under section 117 of the 1954 Code depends
upon whether the primary purpose of the payment is to further the
education and training of the recipient or whether the primary purpose is
to serve the interest of the grantor. The problem is usually somewhat
difficult of solution because of the fact that in most of the situations there
is a dual or mutual benefit involved. The question of necessity must be
resolved on a factual basis and depends upon the facts and circumstances
in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied by court.)
An objective study of the italicized portion of the above quote
could well leave the reader somewhat up in the air. One might
properly ask-What, in fact, is the test? Has there really been any
change in philosophy on the part of the courts as a result of the
enactment of the 1954 Code provision?
2 Gordon, supra note 3, at 151.
'8 35 T.C. 13, 17 (1960).
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It is believed that, in spite of the apparent increase in contro-
versies and notwithstanding the charges leveled by various writers
as set forth hereinabove, there has been a perceptible change. It is
felt that there has been an effort on the part of the courts to liberalize
their thinking consistent with the intent of Congress. Clearly, it
would seem that the pre-1954 "quid pro quo" test espoused in
Robertson34 has been watered down to some extent. At least it can
be said that if it can be shown that the award is not compensatory
in nature and that the grantor has not or will not derive any economic
benefit fom the services performed by the grantee, there is today
more likelihood that the award will be held to be excludable from
gross income. In 1952 the Supreme Court in Robertson took the
position that "it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic
benefit from"35 the grantee's services. It is in this sense that one
must interpret the phrase "to serve the interest of the grantor" as
used by the Tax Court in the above quote from Chander P. Bhalla.3 6
81 United States v. Robertson, 190 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951).
13 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
835 T.C. 13, 17 (1960).
